

INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF STRUGGLE (PDI PERJUANGAN) STRATEGY IN 2019 WEST JAVA PROVINCE LEGISLATIVE ELECTION

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Abstract

Purpose of the study: This study analyses the strategy of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan/PDI P) in dealing with the 2019 legislative elections in West Java Province. As a nationalist party that gained the most seats in the West Java Provincial Parliament from the 2014 election results, PDI Perjuangan faced the challenge of being able to maintain their votes and seats in the 2019 Elections.

Methodology: This study used a qualitative method with a descriptive approach. Data sources consist of primary and secondary data. Primary data is data obtained from interviews, FGDs, and observations, while secondary data is obtained from various official documents sourced from the party and the Election Commission. The data obtained is then validated using data triangulation techniques.

Main Findings: Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan) as one of the political party which participating in the election has adopted several actions that are believed to be able to increase the votes of voters in the 2019 general election. Although the results have not been optimal, because the party had to lose a few seats in the Regional Representative Council (DPRD) as a result of the legislative election, this has given the party lessons to streamline party machinery by considering the heterogeneous conditions of the West Java region sociologically and demographically, especially in strengthening party identification.

Applications of this study: This research is expected to be able to provide theoretical benefits, especially for the development of theories or concepts from political winning strategies by political parties through political communication. With the development of the theory or concept, it is hoped that other similar research will emerge and be able to criticize it scientifically.

Novelty/Originality of this study: From researching on some of the previous studies, the researchers saw that there were no similar studies that examined the political strategy of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle in winning the 2019 legislative elections in West Java.

Keywords: General Elections, Political Parties, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, West Java, Strategy.

INTRODUCTION

Political parties are needed in a country that applies a democratic political system. Political parties become a means of aggregation and articulation of people's interests and aspirations through formal institutions (<u>Easton, 1990</u>; <u>Djuyandi, 2017</u>; <u>Budiardjo, 2014</u>). Through its role, political parties become part of the political superstructure that plays a role in a country's democracy. In addition, to encourage people to participate actively in political activities, parties also still need to be political institutions that are able to accommodate and fight for the political interests of their members, because parties are institutions that are built on certain bases, such as the basis of social class, religion, regionalism and nationalism (Joyce, 2008).

The existence of party bases makes the party generally not only have a characteristic in its political movement but also for those who later become followers, namely the mass base or its constituents (<u>Joyce, 2008</u>; <u>Djuyandi, 2017</u>). For example, parties are based on nationalism which generally has a mass base of nationalist groups with nationalist ideas, or religious-based parties that have a pattern of movement on the basis of a particular religion and have a mass base of certain religions. In the case of Indonesia, political parties also have different principles or ideologies from one another, namely parties that have Islamic ideology, the mass base of Islam and nationalist parties. <u>Geertz (1983)</u> also revealed this in the results of his research on three Javanese political groups, namely santri (Islamic educated people), abangan (common people), and priyayi (traditional aristocrats), where all three were considered to have a political preference.

Although the party was built on the basis of specific political identity which then makes the movement pattern and its mass base to be different, <u>Joyce (2008)</u> said that in general, all political parties had the same goal, to secure power and exercise control over the government; it was also stated that in securing (obtaining) power, political parties will compete openly with other parties, and this is a feature of the implementation of liberal democracy.

In 2019, West Java Province was a province with a very significant number of voters. Data from the West Java Regional Election Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum (KPU) Daerah Jawa Barat, 2019) shows that for simultaneous elections in 2019, total voters reached 33,270,845 with a ratio of 16,724,460 male voters, and 16,546,385 female voters; making West Java the province with the largest number of voters. This amount represents 33% of the total voters in Indonesia; strengthening the notion that Java is the key in general elections. The voters were divided into 138,050 ballots in 27



districts/cities, 627 sub-districts, urban villages and 5,957 villages. West Java is a province with very strong swinging voters, since the democratic elections that took place in 1999; no political party has been able to become a winner for the second time.

Political Party	Number of Chairs in Period		
	2009- 2014	2014- 2019	2019- 2024
PKB	2	A 7	▲ 12
Gerindra	8	▲ 11	▲ 25
PDI Perjuangan	17	▲ 20	- 20
Solkar	16	▲ 17	▼ 16
PKS	13	▼ 12	▲ 21
PPP	8	A 9	▼ 3
PAN	5	▼ 4	A 7
Hanura	3	- 3	▼ 0
Demokrat	28	▼ 12	▼ 11
Nas Dem		(New Party) 5	▼ 4
Perindo			(New Party) 1
Number of Legislative Members	100	— 100	▲ 120
Number of Parties	9	▲ 10	- 10

Figure 1: Distribution of Political Party Chairs from 2009 until 2019 Elections in West Java Provincial House of Representative

Source: Taken from various sources: West Java Regional Election Commission (KPU Daerah Jawa Barat), 2019; and West Java Provincial House of Representative, 2019.

West Java is an area known as one of the bases of the constituents of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan). This can be seen from the PDI Perjuangan vote since the first General Election after the reform movement in 1998. However, the data shows that there is a tendency that the votes obtained by PDI Perjuangan continue to decline from 1999 to 2019. The percentage of DPRD chairs in the region even reaches one third.

In fact, West Java is an agricultural area based on farmers; this strengthens the region's base as a traditional base. The decline in the PDI Perjuangan seats is an indication of the still weak political victory strategy implemented by PDI Perjuangan in maintaining its constituent base in West Java.

Another challenge faced by PDI Perjuangan and also other political parties participating in the election is the tendency of lower citizen political participation. KPUD data shows that the number of citizens' political participation in the regional election and the presidential election is decreasing. In an effort to deal with the elections in 2018, an appropriate strategy is needed to restore the superiority of PDIP as the winning party for general elections and regional elections in the region.

This study will focus on how the PDI Perjuangan, as an election participant, maintains its position as a winner in the 2019 general election.

Research on political strategies carried out by parties in dealing with elections is not a new thing, at least this research found several other similar studies, such as research on the winning strategy of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan) in the Election of President and Vice President in 2014 (<u>Turtiantoro, 2015</u>; <u>Agama, 2015</u>). The strategy of winning PDI Perjuangan in regional elections in Manado (<u>Lumbessy, 2016</u>).






Figure 2: Numbers of Political Patry Ballots In 2019 Election

Source: West Java Regional Election Commission (KPU Daerah Jawa Barat), 2019

Strategies for winning political parties in the legislative elections, including efforts to win the 2014 elections (<u>Lindawati</u>, 2013), including by the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in the 2004 legislative elections (<u>Umarama</u>, 2009; and <u>Azlina</u>, 2005) in this study Umarama conducted research in Sula Islands Regency, North Maluku Province, while Azlina in DKI Jakarta Province. From previous studies, the researchers saw that there were no similar studies that examined the political winning strategy of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan) while preparing the 2019 West Java Province Legislative Election.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The strategy of winning constituents deals with one's choice in elections, which means talking about voting behavior. Broadly speaking, there are three models that can explain why someone chooses a particular party or figure, and why not choose another figure or party. The three models, based on the conception offered by <u>Roth (2012)</u>), are sociological, psychological and rational models

1) Sociological Approach

Roth explained that the sociological approach, or more precisely the social structural approach to explaining election behavior, is logically divided into micro-sociological explanatory models and macro-sociological explanatory models. The usual microsurgical explanation model is associated with sociologist Lazersfeld, Berelson and Gaudet from Columbia University. Therefore, this model is also called the Columbia School (Roth, 2012).

The basic model of the micro-sociological explanation comes from the social circle theory formulated by Simmel (1890) at the end of the last century. According to this theory, every human being is bound in various social circles, every human being is bound in various social circles, for example, families, circles of colleagues, workplaces. Lazeersfeld applies this way of thinking to voters. A voter lives in a certain context: his economic status, religion, place of residence, work and age define the social circle that influences the voter's decision. Every social circle has its own norm, compliance with these norms results in integration. But this context also controls individual behavior by putting pressure on the individual to adjust, because basically everyone wants to live peacefully, without arguing with their social environment (Roth, 2012).

Mujani explained that a voter chooses a party or candidate for certain public officials because of the similarity between the characteristics of the sociological voters and the sociological characteristics of the party or candidate (<u>Mujani, 2012</u>). One of the sociological factors is religion. Political parties or candidates for public officials who have the same religious platform as the characteristics of religious voters, tend to be supported by these voters. A Muslim tends to choose a party with an Islamic platform compared to other religious platforms, such as Christianity. Religious people tend to support parties that have a religious platform compared to the secular platform (<u>Mujani, 2012</u>).

Regarding social class issues and religious, racial, and ethnic sentiments are also believed to be sociological factors that influence how a person chooses political parties or candidates for public officials. Traditionally struggling ethnic and racial equality parties tend to be supported by racial and ethnic minority groups because this group has a direct interest in the issue. More specifically, racial and ethnic similarities between voters and candidates for public officials tend to influence someone's choosing behavior (Mujani, 2012).



In the context of regional sentiment, it was explained that prospective public officials who origins or attachments to certain regions had tended to be supported by voters from the regions concerned. Although different in terms of ethnicity, a candidate for a public official who lives or normally fights for the interests of a particular region tends to be supported by voters from the region concerned.

The sociological approach, it must be admitted, has a very strong influence on analyzing positive behavior. However, that does not mean that this approach does not have limitations. Often in modern society, society has strong space and social mobility, which in turn tends to result in a breakdown of existing relationships. The association of individuals with several fields of social power (which sometimes also contradict each other) is called cross pressure. Such inconsistencies can cause a decline in the political interest of the individual concerned (Roth, 2012). Another limitation is that this approach also ignores the potential for conflict in each person. That is, everyone has the potential for resistance, protest and not submit to the social system that surrounds it.

2) Psychological approach

The psychological approach to analyzing voter behavior is to look at individual factors. Roth (2012) calls this approach to the term social psychological approach. The psychological social approach was born to a group of social scientists from the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. This approach places the individual as the center of attention. According to the Ann Arbor School, personal perceptions and judgments of the candidate or the themes raised (short-term influence) greatly influence the choice of elections that are dropped. In addition, "psychological membership" in a party that can be measured in the form of party identification variables, contributes to the choice of elections, which is the result of various long-term influences. Therefore, the election decisions of each individual in primary are not socially structured but are the result of the individual's short-term and long-term influence.

The social-psychological approach seeks to explain what factors influence short-term election decisions or decisions taken in a short time. This attempts to be explained through a determinant trias, namely party identification, candidate orientation and issue/theme orientation. Meanwhile, other pre-existing factors (such as membership in certain social groups) are considered to have a direct influence on election behavior. The core of this rationale is expressed in the form of a variable namely party identification.

Party Identification is often inherited by parents to their children. As age increases, party identification becomes more stable and intensive. Party Identification is a permanent orientation, which does not change from election to election. But if someone experiences a large personal change (such as marriage, profession or residence) or an extraordinary political situation (such as an economic crisis or war), then the identification of this party may change. (Roth, 2012)

In the same approach, <u>Mujani (2012)</u> explains that a citizen participates in an election or presidential election not only because his condition is better socio-economically, or because he is on a social network, but because he is interested in politics, has a feeling close to a particular party (party identity), have enough information to make choices, feel their voice is meaningful, and believe that their choices can contribute to improving political efficacy.

One of the important things related to the Psychological approach is political engagement, one of which is the question of partisanship (party identity). Partisanship is a psychological state, namely the feeling of being close to, being supportive or loyal to, or identifying yourself with a particular political party. Partisanship forms a political identity of a citizen because the citizen has the psychological ability to identify himself with a political party. Because of that, partisanship is usually called someone's party identification. A partisan is someone who feels himself part of a party or identifies himself with a particular party. (Mujani, 2012).

In short, the social-psychological approach explains what factors influence the decisions of short-term elections or decisions taken in a short period of time, which are explained by the determinant trias, namely party identification, candidate orientation, and political issue orientation.

In practice, a sociological approach intersects with a psychological approach. Someone who chooses a candidate may be due to the similarity of ethnicity and religion. However, this is mediated by perceptions and attitudes, both of these sociological factors and of political parties or candidates. In Mujani (2012) terms, what emerges later is not an objective sociological factor, but a sociological factor as perceived. In the process, the importance of sociological factors will be related to psychological factors.

METHODOLOGY

This study uses a qualitative method with a descriptive approach to explain or describe the strategy of PDI-P's political strategy in West Java Province. The location of this study was conducted in West Java. For the method of collecting data in this study alone, the author conducted an interview by preparing interview guidelines first. In this study, there are two types of data obtained by researchers in the form of primary data in the form of interviews as the main ones against predetermined informants and also the second secondary data as supporting data obtained from relevant agencies in the form of documents and references from the internet sourced, such as election result data and the acquisition of seats in the West Java Regional House of Representatives (DPRD). Interviews were conducted with a number of informants, such as: chairperson of PDI Perjuangan branch office in Subang Regency and Cirebon Regency, the Deputy of PDI



Perjuangan Regional Representative Office in West Java Province. From the data obtained, the author uses the triangulation of data to sort out what goes into the main data to be used as the material in the discussion and which data is only a supplement.

DISCUSSION / ANALYSIS

The 1999 General Election was the first general election held democratically after the New Order era. National election results show PDI-P as the election-winning party. The 1999 elections results from 6 parties that won seats in the DPR (from 48 parties fighting in elections) with the following composition of seats: PDI-P (153), Golkar Party (120), PPP (58), PKB (51), PAN (41), and the United Nations (13). The 2004 elections that were followed by fewer parties compared to the 1999 elections (only 24 parties) actually resulted in a far more varied distribution of power between parties. The number of seats won was Golkar Party (133), PDI-P (108), PPP (57), Democratic Party (57), PKB (53), PAN (49), PKS (45), PBR (13), PBB (11), PDS (10), PKPI (3), Freedom Party (2), PKPB (2), PPDK (2), PPIB (1), and PPDI (1). Thus, out of the 24 parties that participated in the 2004 Election, there were 16 parties that gain seats in the DPR; but of the 16 parties that won the DPR seats, only ten parties received ten or more seats, and only seven parties obtained more than five percent seats.

The 2009 election results showed a tendency for the PDI-P vote to decline. The same thing applies also at the local level, at the level of the Provincial Local HoR and the Regency/City Local HoR in West Java the decline also occurs significantly. The results of the analysis show that when compared to the seats of the Local HoR in the 1999 elections, it can be said that the number of PDI Perjuangan seats actually declined.

The data in table 1 shows that the dominance of PDI Perjuangan in the Local HoR in the 2004 election was relatively dominant, together with the Golkar Party, PDI Perjuangan controlled a majority of seats in the Local HoR; and surprisingly the voice of the Democratic Party which was able to achieve a real voice despite being a new party.

In the 2009 election even though the proportion of PDI Perjuangan seats in the Local HoR declined. The addition of the number of seats in the Local HoR seats cannot be utilized optimally by PDI Perjuangan. This can be seen from the relatively fixed number of Local HoR seats and surprisingly the Democratic Party's votes were able to reach the first position, an achievement for the new party.

The 2014 election actually brought a surprise, where the dominance of the PDIP was even stronger; the seat of the chair of the National Assembly could be won by the PDIP. But this selection also describes the nuances of the new parati, where the distribution of seats is more evenly distributed. Even Nasdem and Hanura as the new party were able to gain significant votes so they were able to put their representatives in the Local HoR seat.

The surprise also occurred in the election in 2019, although the results were still temporary, but it can be ascertained that the Gerindra Party was the champion and would-be deputy as chairman of the West Java Local HoR 2019-2023.

Of the four general elections, it can be observed that in addition to the tendency of a decline in PDI Perjuangan seats, it also shows that the distribution of power between parties is far more varied at the local level.

 No.
 Year
 Number
 Percentage

 1.
 2004
 19
 19

 2.
 2009
 17
 17

 3.
 2014
 20
 20

13

2019

Table 1: Number of Legislators of PDIP in Subang and Cirebon Regency

Sources: West Java Regional Election Commission (KPU Daerah Jawa Barat), 2019

11%*

The lower votes obtained by PDI Perjuangan are also accompanied by the lower number of citizen political participation in elections. Referring to the West Java Regional Election Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum (KPU) Daerah Jawa Barat), there was a tendency to decrease the number of community participation in the West Java Governor Election (Pilgub). This can be seen from the participation rates in the West Java Election 2004 to 2013. Based on data from the West Java Regional Election Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum (KPU) Daerah Jawa Barat, 2014), in 2004 the implementation of West Java Pilgub was 86.19 percent. With the number of permanent voter lists (DPT) as many as 26,180,058. Then in the West Java Election 2008, the community participation rate dropped to 67.31 percent with a DPT of 27,933,259. The voter participation rate again dropped in the implementation of the 2013 West Java Pilgub by 63.85 percent with a number of DPT 32. 440. 236. That number is smaller than the Pilgub in 2008.

Community participation in elections in the West Java region, particularly in the regional elections, has been degraded or there has been a decline, several reasons why voter turnout has dropped, one of which is due to voter disappointment with government performance, lack of awareness of the voters themselves and other factors.

But voter participation in the 2019 Election reached 75 percent; It was based on the results of monitoring of the Greater Bandung area and reports from other districts/cities in West Java. When compared to the 2014 Election, Rifqy said the



level of public participation in the election increased this time. The number of people who did not use their votes reached 30 percent, still below the target of 77 percent voter participation.

Third, the still strong factor figure in the regional election makes PDI Perjuangan's strategy in maintaining its constituent base in the two research areas still dependent on the figure of political party leaders. As a result, when there is internal political party chaos as happened in PDI Perjuangan in Subang Regency, the bad image will be attached to the party and reduce the attractiveness of political parties in the eyes of constituents. This also shows the inability of the functioning of political parties as a means of political education.

The strength of the figure is shown by the 2014 legislative election. The success of the PDI Perjuangan was even followed by the achievement of candidates from bull-bearing parties in the circle; Maruarar Sirait who was able to collect the most votes was 74,410 votes. Maruarar's success was overshadowed by the sound of soap opera artist Primus Yustisio who became a legislative candidate for the DPR RI from PAN by collecting 34,525 votes. The appearance of Primus Yustisio as a legislative candidate shows the still strong figure in the general role. This shows that political parties have failed to carry out their functions as a means of political education.

The Power of Figure on the Governor Election

Winners of General Elections in West Java are always changing. No political party is able to maintain victory in West Java. In fact, the victory of the Election of the Governor and the President is always different from the winner of the legislative elections. The pattern of West Java voters is always different when choosing candidates for the Governor and the president and political parties. So, the victory of the Legislative election is not in line with the presidential election, (Manan, 2019). Only in the 1999 general election where the Local HoR was controlled by Golkar, the gubernatorial election was won by Danny Setiawa; where elections are conducted by the Local HoR.

In the Governor's Election in 2009 and 2014, Ahmad Heryawan who was superior as Governor defeated candidates from the Democratic Party and PDI Perjuangan as the winner of the legislative elections. The same thing was repeated in the 2018 governor's election, the elected governor's party did not get many seats in the local parliament. The winner is actually the party that once nominated the elected Governor when advancing for the mayor. This further reinforces the view that voter attachment to political parties is low, not only a problem in West Java. Moreover, West Java has a subculture with different characters; there are at least six subcultures that can be grouped, including Bandung Raya, West Priangan, East, Cirebonan, Karawang, and Suburban (the capital buffer).

This shows that the characteristics of voters in West Java are very heterogeneous. As if voters are not loyal, easy to change, attachment to political parties is also low. Voters are more interested in figures, making fighting in West Java difficult to predict. He mentioned that there was a high level of undecided voters at 20-30%. Even those who have made a choice are not strong voters.

Those who will benefit from this simultaneous election are the parties nominating themselves as presidential candidates namely PDIP and Gerindra; which is where the Gerindra Party is even able to shift the electability of the Golkar Party which is usually always in the top two. This shows that the traditional base of the Golkar Party was also undermined.

Fourth, a combination of psychological approaches and sociological approaches is needed for voters.

In terms of demographics, in terms of religion, the majority of Sundanese people are Muslim, but few are Christian, Hindu and Sundanese. The homogeneity of ethnic and religious composition in West Java is directly proportional when looking at the composition of legislative candidates. All candidates are Muslim and are generally Sundanese and Javanese. There are only a few that are not native to Sundanese, but generally, they are born and raised in West Java. From this point of view, the actual struggle of the candidates to win the sympathy of voters is very heavy, because all have equal opportunities.

The West Java voter has a relatively traditional voter base. These areas tend to have strong ties to Sundanese culture and have a high level of religiosity. Sundanese society has indeed had a religious typology, where they tend to like religious symbols. This is different from the people on the north coast.

The author believes that this factor is sufficient to contribute to the acquisition of votes obtained. The sentiment of Islamic organizations still seems to be an effective enough attraction to garner support. Ironically, the potential strength of this Islamic mass base is not enough for political parties to glance at submitting candidates for their candidates.

The thick nuances of religiosity are actually formed in a long period of time. History records that Islam had experienced a golden age in West Java when Sunan Gunung Djati or Syarief Hidayatullah built three Islamic political powers namely Banten, Jayakarta and Cirebon. The period was the most brilliant Islamic sultanate in the history of Islamic political power in West Java (Suryanegara, 2013). Since the Parliamentary era in 1955 to the New Order, West Java has also become one of the provinces that have become the voice of the Masyumi Party, which in fact is known as an Islamic Party.



Apart from religious factors, ethnic factors turned out to be not quite influential. This is because almost all couples represent this ethnicity. In the end, as explained earlier, voters no longer consider this factor. All candidates have the same opportunity to get support from the Sundanese.

With the explanation above, it can be said that sociological factors become one of the factors that determine in shaping voting behavior. However, this factor does not seem to be the dominant thing, because there are still psychological factors that will be explained in the next section.

Psychological factors related to party identity. This ID party is a psychological component that will contribute to the stability of the party system in Indonesia, continuity or stability of political parties can occur if voters identify themselves with the party. If only a few have party IDs, then the continuity of support for the party will be weak (Campbell, et.al., 1960).

Many factors influence this, one of which is the reduction of party id, political parties are still considered more concerned and fight for their internal affairs, even though political parties are a tool of political communication and channels of people's aspirations. In each electoral contestation of regional head elections, figures from outside the party emerged that appeared to be more popular and thus had a greater chance of being elected as governors, mayors, or regents.

This forced the party to accommodate these figures and ignored the cadres themselves if among the cadres were less popular; this would, in fact, be a little more disruptive to the internal stability of the party concerned. It also seems that the Party seems to embrace public figures outside politics, music communities, regional entity communities and mass organizations in the successful team of their regional head candidates, although it is legitimate and makes the contest more interesting, this makes the weakness of the role of political parties more visible. In gaining the heart or perpetuating the voice in the community.

One way to improve this party identification is how the party improves the party's internal regeneration system, which sometimes they complain about the lack of funds available for regeneration itself, in fact, there are three funding sources for political parties according to Article 35 paragraph (1) of Law No. 2/2011 About Political Parties, namely member contributions, state contributions (National/Regional Budget), and other legal contributions. However, this is still considered lacking by political parties.

So that the reason for political parties without any significant improvement in recruitment patterns. In fact, by improving the regeneration system, they will get candidates for regional and state leaders from internal parties with integrity and loyalty to the party so that the community will automatically trust and feel identified with parties whose cadres feel they believe and the emergence of continuity of support to the party that is.

Elite parties as political producers must provide better political offers or alternatives through good party performance and programs and offer better candidates. They must be present not only at election time. The image of the party that is free from corruption must also be increased. Even if the parties cannot produce cadres who have the soul of a leader, a more organized mechanism must be built-in building the coalition. Thus, the coalition did not actually create divisions within the party that were not seen by the public.

This is where the public faces a political consumer dilemma. If the party's credibility is low, the party program is only beautiful on paper and the candidates offered are bad, the public is only faced with two choices: keep choosing from bad choices or getting farther away from political parties or not choosing at all.

Psychological approaches are not only based on party identification. Other things included are candidate orientation and issue/theme orientation. In terms of candidate orientation, almost no legislative candidate is based on the orientation of the issue or theme that will be fought for.

This candidate orientation is then related to issue orientation or theme. In terms of issues and themes, there are no candidates who are able to package them well enough. Political parties are no longer the main reference for voters. It is precisely the positive self-image built through outdoor media that is now the main reference for voters.

It is also interesting to see the character of the West Javanese people who are known to be very melodramatic; when someone presents himself as a person who is caring, doing good, looks religious and so on, this gap seems to have not been fully utilized by prospective legislators.

But factor figures also cannot be the only ones that are relied upon. This must also be accompanied by an accurate strategy from the campaign team to see the potential of the market (voters) and use the right strategy, according to the needs of the voting community. And another thing that can't be underestimated is the foresight of the winning team.

Winning Strategy

Seeing the complexity of voters in West Java, a special strategy is needed to win elections in West Java. On the Simultaneous Election, PDI Perjuangan sharpened the trident strategy in the final phase before the election of the West Java gubernatorial election. They are optimistic that the pair of candidates for governor and deputy governor, TB



Hasanuddin-Anton Charliyan (Hasanah) who carried him can win the contestation. The strategy applied by Hasanah bearers' parties has so far been quite effective. The indicator, Hasanah electability through internal surveys has reached 20 percent.

There are three important elements used in the trident strategy; first, maximizing the entire structural party including factions, members of the Provincial Local HoR, regency/city Local HoR to branch managers.

Second, by maximizing political party wings such as Banteng Muda Indonesia (BMI), to work on the millennial generation through social media. Finally, working on the community, volunteers to professional groups and hobbies who are also the majority are the younger generation.

Millennials are indeed one of the focuses in this trident. Hope can be at least 50 percent of millennials. In addition, the winning team also took advantage of Jokowi's popularity based on internal surveys, 70 percent of the people said that Joko Widodo was identical with PDI Perjuangan. The enthusiasm for winning the 2018 regional head election is very high for cadres because we see that radicalism and terrorism are real threats.

Consolidation refers to all party managers, cadres until sympathizers will move to win the PDI Perjuangan pair in the West Java Governor election. Campaign funds will be used to finance the final winning stance, which is a door-to-door campaign, and pay around 75 thousand witnesses on Election Day; with the support of 450 thousand volunteers, they will be mobilized to knock on the doors of people's homes and invite them to choose them; who worked carrying leaflets and explained their vision and mission.

Another step taken is to hold a national safari in 8 regions, one of which is West Java. The PDI P Secretary-General explained that the safari was at the same time made a consolidation event to win the 2019 Pileg and Presidential Election so that the votes obtained in the region could later be improved.

CONCLUSION

Based on the results of the research conducted by the researcher, some conclusions can be drawn, namely: first, there is a tendency for the vote to be lowered by PDI Perjuangan as the party participating in the election. Secondly, the lower the votes obtained by PDI Perjuangan also accompanied by the lower number of citizens' political participation in the election. Third, the still strong factor figure in the regional election makes PDI Perjuangan's strategy in maintaining its constituent base in the two research areas still dependent on the figure of political party leaders; as well as using social media to reach millennial generations.

As a result, when there is internal political party chaos as happened in PDI Perjuangan, the bad image will be attached to the party and reduce the attractiveness of political parties for the voters. This also shows the inability of the functioning of political parties as a means of political education. Fourth, a combination of psychological approaches and sociological approaches is needed for voters.

LIMITATION AND STUDY FORWARD

Other researchers interested in the development of Political Science are encouraged to conduct further research and development on the winning strategy in the election. This is useful to test the validity of the findings of this study.

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